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Abstract
Smart vehicles tend to choose an over-the-air (OTA) software (SW) 
update service. In an environment with smart vehicles, software mal-
functions may have serious consequences such as accidents involv-
ing human lives and property loss. Therefore, we must ensure that 
the software updates in smart vehicles are completed correctly. In 
this study, we focused on the assurance of both data integrity and 
service integrity in smart vehicles to improve the OTA SW update 
service security. To this end, the security features of integrity in smart 
vehicles were identified and discussed with an emphasis on its po-
tential impact on future vehicular applications.
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The modern vehicle has become a complex system 
that can communicate with its environment and act 
autonomously with the support of its sensors and em-
bedded computers (Mahmud et al., 2005; Le et al., 
2018). The modern vehicle is called a smart vehicle 
and is distinguished from the legacy mechanical ve-
hicle. Owing to cutting-edge technology, a smart ve-
hicle can be defined as one with the functionalities of 
both an autonomous vehicle and a connected vehicle 
(Halder et al., 2019). Khurram et al. (2016) predicted 
that three-fourths of the modern vehicles will be con-
nected to a network and the Internet by 2020. This 
change will result in vehicles with advanced functions, 
high performance, high efficiency, and increased user 
convenience (Le et al., 2018). The advanced func-
tions of smart vehicles and the corresponding servic-
es for users are deeply related to the software (SW) 
developed in association with the hardware (HW) of 
these vehicles. The SW portion in smart vehicles has 
increased. In environments with smart vehicles, soft-
ware malfunctions may have serious consequences, 
such as accidents involving human lives and property 
loss. In the case of a legacy closed-system vehicle, 
a malfunction is due to HW faults or bugs in the SW 
installed (Nilsson et al., 2008). The traditional solution 
was to recall with a physical collection the vehicles 
with the problem and fix these vehicles. However, the 
fixing of all of these vehicles was very time consum-
ing. During the time until fixation, the persons inside 
the vehicles and/or outside would be in danger and 
property loss might occur.
In contrast, with an increase in the SW portion of 
smart vehicles, the SW update cost has increased.
However, because a smart vehicle has the func-
tionality of a connected vehicle, its SW can be easily 
updated via a network connection without a physical 
recall process (Riggs et al., 2019). In particular, an 
over-the-air (OTA) SW update service via a wireless 
network without the constraints of the vehicles’ phys-
ical location is being expanded because of its con-
venience and economic feasibility. An OTA SW update 
service denotes an SW update service provided by 
the SW update provider directly via a network con-
nection (Jo et al., 2017). In the future, smart vehicles 
whose SW portion would be larger than that at pres-
ent will require active OTA SW updates. The advan-
tages of an OTA SW update are as follows (Nilsson 
et al., 2008; Idrees et al., 2011; Khurram et al., 2016; 
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Jo et al., 2017; Halder et al., 2019; Riggs et al., 2019): 
First, a real-time SW update can mitigate the cost 
problems caused by the vehicle guarantee. Second, 
a SW update related to security vulnerability can be 
done as soon as possible against a zero-day attack. 
Third, the costs of physical recall can be eliminated, 
and the time of the guests or users can be saved. 
Fourth, the SW update can be done continuously and 
frequently. In contrast, the disadvantages of an OTA 
SW update are as follows: if the SW update is done 
by the update SW, the update SW can be another 
vulnerable SW to be cared for. When an OTA SW up-
date is done via a data network, it will be exposed 
to network security threats such as tampering and 
spoofing. In addition, it will get affected by the securi-
ty vulnerability of the application domain such as that 
of a smart vehicle. In the studies that addressed the 
OTA SW update vulnerability over a wireless network 
(Mahmud et al., 2005; Nilsson and Larson, 2008; 
Khodari et al., 2019), integrity, confidentiality, authenti-
cation, and key management were stressed. Modern 
vehicles have flash memory in their ECU and are vul-
nerable to malicious code (Ford). In order to maximize 
the advantages of an OTA SW update, the right SW 
to be updated needs to be selected and downloaded 
into the smart vehicle while ensuring that the vehicle 
is not attacked during the download process. Then, 
it should be installed and should replace the old ver-
sion of the SW, as defined, without any interruption 
by attackers. That is, the integrity of both the SW 
and the service should be ensured. Therefore, in this 
study, we focused on the assurance of both the data 
integrity and the service integrity in smart vehicles to 
protect the OTA software update service. To this end, 
the security features of the integrity of smart vehicles 
were identified, and the related research was classi-
fied and discussed with an emphasis on its limitations 
and potential impact on future vehicular applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
in the second section, the OTA SW update service 
is analyzed in terms of its applications, its service 
architecture, and its security vulnerability. In the third 
section, the security requirements for the data and 
service integrity, and the related methods are analyz-
ed. In the fourth section, we conclude this paper and 
briefly discuss the possible future work directions.
OTA SW update service analysis
OTA SW update service application
Smart vehicles can be at a considerable disadvantage 
because of an OTA SW update. When they recognize 
a danger due to vehicle malfunction during driving, 
they can control their driving and take a corrective 
action promptly by connecting to the service center 
because they have the functionality of autonomous 
driving and a network connection. If the malfunction 
is determined to be caused by an SW vulnerability, 
an SW update can be requested and done as soon 
as possible without any user interruption. Therefore, 
many manufacturers are expected to adopt an OTA 
SW update in their smart vehicles.
Ford supports SYNC™ 3 (Tesla), which is applied to 
Ford’s vehicles for the users’ convenience. The system 
has the functionality of an automatic OTA SW update 
when the vehicles are connected to a data network. Te-
sla also supports periodic SW updates to its vehicles of 
Model S, Model 3, Model X, and so on, when the vehi-
cles are connected via a cellular or Wi-Fi network (Ford).
OTA SW update service structure
Figure 1 shows the cloud server, client vehicle, and 
the network (Cebe et al., 2018). The cloud server 
OEM is composed of a third-party manufacturer that 
develops the update SW, and OEM, which distributes 
the update SW. The network is based on the inter-
faces of LTE, 3G cellular, and Wi-Fi. In the near fu-
ture, 5G may be added. The client vehicle gets the 
OTA SW update service from the cloud server OEM 
(Doddapaneni et al., 2017).
Figure 1: OTA SW update service structure.
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The following steps are applied in detail as shown 
in Figure 2 (Odat and Ganesan, 2014):
1.  The third-party manufacturer conveys an update 
SW to OEM. OEM uploads it to the cloud server 
that the client vehicle has access to.
2.  The SW update manager notifies the vehicles or 
the users of the vehicles of the new update SW.
3.  The vehicle requests the SW update and re-
ceives a path to reach the new update SW in the 
cloud server.
4.  The client vehicle accesses the update SW im-
age via the path in the server cloud. When the 
client vehicle finishes the SW image download, it 
verifies and stores the SW image for installation. 
The client transfers the download result of suc-
cess or failure.
5.  When the download fails, the SW download pro-
cess is retried from Step 1. When the download 
succeeds, the vehicle starts to install the new 
SW and changes the SW version.
There may be no Steps 1 and 2. Instead, the SW 
update manager may push the update SW to the 
smart vehicles directly.
Threats for OTA SW update service 
integrity
The OTA SW update service is rapid and economical 
(Kong et al., 2016). However, because of the secu-
rity vulnerability of the wireless network, the attack-
er can intervene and control the update process 
(Nilsson et al., 2008; Checkoway et al., 2011). There-
fore, it is important to analyze the threats (Avizienis 
et al., 2004) to design more secure OTA SW update 
services for smart vehicles.
In order to ensure the integrity of the OTA SW update 
service, both data integrity and service integrity should 
be ensured. Data integrity denotes that no change or 
creation or deletion of data by an unauthorized par-
ty was done (Fongen, 2012; Mathur et al., 2015). Ser-
vice integrity implies that the service process, i.e., SW 
access, download, and installation, is unadulterated 
by malware or other hostile modifications (Kuppusamy 
et al., 2016). Data integrity can be invaded if the data 
in the cloud are modified by an attacker (Knockel and 
Crandall, 2012). The contaminated SW may threaten 
vehicle safety and human lives. It may let the attacker 
control the vehicle remotely. Service integrity can be 
invaded by the attacks of man-in-the-middle (Ashibani 
and Mahmoud, 2017), spoofing, node capture, selective 
forwarding, and sinkhole (Mayilsamy et al., 2018). From 
the start of the update SW download to the SW installa-
tion, service integrity can be invaded.
Integrity assurance for OTA SW  
update service
Security requirement for OTA SW update 
integrity
In order to ensure data integrity, it should be difficult 
for an attacker to modify the update SW (Halder et al., 
2019). Unauthorized access to the update SW, such 
as modification, creation, or deletion, should be con-
trolled. Any modification to the original update SW 
should be detected.
For service integrity, the transmission channel of 
the update SW image, the protocol, and the service 
Figure 2: Data and service integrity.
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architecture from the distribution point to the client 
vehicle via the transmission path should be structured 
securely. The service integrity should be checked at 
all transmission sections and relay points. All unde-
fined changes should be detected.
Therefore, the security requirements of the OTA 
SW update integrity can be summarized as follows:
•	 At the start of the SW update, the SW update 
should be recognized by the user of the smart 
vehicle, the smart vehicle, and the SW distrib-
utor. The update service process and the SW 
image transmitted should be transparent and 
recognizable.
•	 The update SW image should be transferred 
from the distribution point to the destination 
vehicle through secure channels. Moreover, 
its transmission should be trackable. A secure 
channel will ensure that there is no data mod-
ification or can detect any modification made 
during the transmission.
•	 The update SW should be stored securely in 
the vehicle, and the download process should 
be secured before installation.
•	 Some parts of the OTA SW update structure 
installed in the participants such as smart vehi-
cles, users, or distributors should be managed 
to check their security vulnerabilities and to be 
made secure against cyber-attacks.
In order to satisfy the security requirements, the 
following issues should be addressed:
•	 service integrity assurance for an OTA SW 
update between the vehicle, distribution 
center, and the update management center 
at the distribution time and at the SW update 
completion;
•	 service integrity assurance before and after the 
transmission of one transmission section from 
the distribution cloud to the vehicle;
•	 service integrity assurance at the relay points 
between the transmission sections;
•	 data integrity assurance between the original 
update SW and the distributed one; and
•	 service and data integrity for the OTA SW up-
date process.
Method classification for OTA SW update 
integrity
Figure 3 shows the classification of the technologies 
to ensure data integrity and service integrity. Single 
methods or complex methods have been proposed 
for ensuring data integrity and service integrity.
Data integrity
Basically, a hash function is used to check the data 
integrity. Digital signatures and cryptography using a 
key to check the data authenticity are used addition-
ally. Parity check, cyclical redundancy check, Ham-
ming code, and block sum check are also used to 
detect some errors during a network transmission.
Figure 3: Method classification for OTA software update integrity.
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Nilsson (Mahmud et al., 2005) proposed an in-
tegrity check scheme using hash and cipher block-
chain (CBC) in a vehicle and an SW update portal. 
The cypher text encrypted with a key shared by the 
portal and a vehicle cannot be decrypted without the 
key. A hash chain of a data fragment where the pre-
vious data fragment is used to make the next frag-
ment hash is used to ensure data integrity. He also 
proposed a secure system for an ECU SW update. 
A hash function is used for ensuring data integri-
ty (Checkoway et al., 2011). An authentication code 
from the hash chain and an update firmware binary 
are transmitted together. The verification of the au-
thentication code ensures the firmware integrity. One 
drawback of his studies, memory overhead, was ad-
dressed in the study (Kuppusamy et al., 2016).
Mayilsamy (Abbas and Sung-Bong, 2019) pro-
posed an integrated method of steganography and 
cryptography to verify the data integrity, as shown in 
Figure 4. He used cryptography to secure the data 
in the cloud. Figure 4 shows the process to store the 
update SW image in the cloud.
The methods using cryptography with keys have 
the traditional issue of key sharing and manage-
ment. As the number of vehicles increases, the key 
management becomes complex. Because the se-
curity stability of cryptography depends on the key, 
the key should be handled carefully to ensure that it 
is not exposed. The secure key update and the se-
cure sharing of key are other issues. Data integrity 
check refers to end-to-end integrity checking. That 
is, whether the correct data or SW are downloaded 
are checked without considering the update mid-pro-
cess. The checking methods in detail include a hash 
comparison of the data or SW image, the distributor’s 
signature check, and a joint signature together with 
the third parties. However, a genuine signature and a 
secure signature update are often assumed.
Service integrity
Blockchain ensures the integrity by the consensus 
of the distributed nodes that are connected to each 
other (Gao et al., 2018; Dhakal et al., 2019). As shown 
in Figure 5, the blockchain has the structure com-
posed of a data layer and a network layer.
The data layer checks the data authenticity by 
a digital signature with a public key and checks the 
data integrity with a hash function and a hash chain 
of data blocks. Because the chain in a blockchain can 
be created and managed by the consensus of the 
blockchain nodes without no central control node, it 
is difficult to modify the blockchain without a majority 
vote (Gao et al., 2018).
Dhakal et al. (2019) proposed an IoT device firm-
ware update model by using blockchain. The up-
date model is composed of Firmware Manufacturer, 
Figure 4: Integrated solution of RSA and steganography.
Figure 5: Blockchain structure.
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Update Server, Update Manager, and IoT Device. 
When the update SW is prepared at manufacturer, 
the update server manages the metadata for the up-
date SW by using the blockchain and starts the de-
vice update.
Fraga-Lamas (Abbas and Sung-Bong, 2019) stat-
ed that OEM, vehicles, service center, and their relat-
ed nodes can be placed on a blockchain. They can 
exchange data with each other and communicate via 
the blockchain.
Steger (Fraga-Lamas and Fernández-Caramés, 
2019) proposed a new SW update framework called 
SecUp based on IEEE 802.11s. SecUp utilizes the 
secure framework wpa_supplicant. The authentica-
tion of the wireless vehicle interface (WVI) uses both 
a symmetric key algorithm and a non-symmetric key 
algorithm. The NFC smart card and the PIN code are 
used as the first authentication of the system. Fur-
thermore, with the WVI network key shared, SecUp is 
connected to the IEEE 802.11s network. Data integrity 
is ensured by the hash value verification.
Stević (Steger et al., 2018) proposed another up-
date framework, ARA::UCM. It filters abnormal data 
by a package validation test and version tracking.
In contrast, the update framework (TUF) provides 
secure SW storage (Stević et al., 2018). Signed meta-
data are used to verify the hash of the SW down-
loaded. Uptane with TUF core was designed by 
Kuppusamy for vehicles (Knockel and Crandall, 2012; 
Kuppusamy et al., 2016). It protects the SW using 
data recovery by using additional storage area, meta-
data broadcasting, vehicle version manifest, and time 
server (Knockel and Crandall, 2012). The most recent 
metadata are shared by broadcasting from Primary 
ECU to Secondary ECU in the vehicle. Manifest sig-
natures are collected using a symmetric key provided 
by OEM. The time server synchronizes time with all 
the ECUs in the vehicle. The synchronized time can 
indicate the outdated metadata.
HSM, which has a secure HW module, is used as 
a secure platform for the SW update. It uses a sym-
metric key for integrity.
Aust (Kuppusamy et al., 2018) used a wake-up 
receiver (WUR) to elevate the access level to the net-
work device or module in the vehicle. WUR responds 
only when the vehicle stays within a predefined area, 
called the trusted zone. It blocks all unauthorized ac-
cess. An SW update can be done only in the trusted 
zone.
Petri et al. (2016) (Aust, 2018) used TPM. At Boot 
ROM, a trust chain is created, and a secure boot is 
executed. During the secure boot process, only se-
cure OS can access the security-related module. The 
other applications are executed separately from TMP.
The blockchain system uses the consensus algo-
rithm between the distributed entities by a majority 
vote. That is, the larger the number of voters is, the 
more secure is the consensus process.
Moreover, to leverage the security of the consen-
sus mechanism, public blockchains, such as Bit-
coin, usually set a restriction on the block size and 
the time interval of the transactions, resulting in low 
transaction throughput. Scalability is thus a difficult 
issue and must be considered in designing block-
chain applications (Dhakal et al., 2019). A vehicle is a 
fast-moving object. How to let the vehicle participate 
in the blockchain for integrity assurance and how to 
solve the delayed consensus should be addressed. A 
smart vehicle needs to make quick decisions for au-
tonomous and safe driving. The communication en-
vironment of a smart vehicle in the real world should 
be considered. The connection status with fast-mov-
ing objects is not stable because of the frequent 
handover processes between different network cells. 
Moreover, the communication QoS of each network 
cell is different.
Thus far, secure storage and secure processing 
platforms have been proposed against partial bun-
dle installation attacks, rollback attacks, endless 
data attacks, mixed-bundles attacks, mix-and-match 
attacks, and arbitrary software attacks (Kuppusamy 
et al., 2016). These studies focused on the inner vehi-
cle security for a secure SW update. Secure methods 
using access control resolve the authentication issue, 
by the management issue of the key and the nonce 
remains unsolved. In addition, the SW structure of 
the SW update scheme should be handled from the 
viewpoint of its security vulnerability and its secure 
update issue.
Conclusion
In this study, we focused on the integrity of a se-
cure OTA SW update service in smart vehicles. The 
security features of integrity in smart vehicles are 
identified from the viewpoints of data integrity and 
service integrity. Furthermore, the related studies 
were classified and discussed with an emphasis on 
their limitations. Because the OTA SW update ser-
vice had security issues originating from smart vehi-
cles as well as those of the services over a wireless 
network, more sophisticated and realistic solu-
tions should be provided. In addition, the proposed 
schemes themselves should be verified in terms of 
their stability with respect to security because any 
trustee or entity cannot be assumed to be honest 
or to remain unattacked forever in a real application 
domain such as a smart vehicle.
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